Human Aspects and Perception of Privacy in Relation to Personalization by Alekh, Sanchit
Human Aspects and Perception of Privacy in
Relation to Personalization
Sanchit Alekh
Informatik  , Databases and Information Systems
Chair Prof. Dr. Stefan Decker
RWTH Aachen University
Aachen, Germany
Abstract. The concept of privacy is inherently intertwined with human
attitudes and behaviours, as most computer systems are primarily de-
signed for human-use. Especially in the case of Recommender Systems,
which feed on information provided by individuals, their e cacy critically
depends on whether or not information is externalized, and if it is, how
much of this information contributes positively to their performance and
accuracy. In this paper, we discuss the impact of several factors on users’
information disclosure behaviours and privacy-related attitudes, and how
users of recommender systems can be nudged into making better privacy
decisions for themselves. Apart from that, we also address the problem
of privacy adaptation, i.e. e ectively tailoring Recommender Systems
by gaining a deeper understanding of people’s cognitive decision-making
process.
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  Introduction
With the success of internet-based services such as online marketplaces, social
networking, digital media streaming et cetera, the use of recommender systems
is becoming increasingly widespread. Almost all the technology giants today, are
using recommender systems in one form or the other [ , ]. On the other hand, at
the receiving end, the number of users of these systems has increased several-folds
in the previous decades [ ], according to the International Telecommunication
Union. While there has been a considerable volume of high-quality research
in the area of automatic recommendation techniques [ , ], there is a common
consensus among privacy scientists that recommender systems algorithms are only
a small contributing factor in the overall user-experience [ ]. This is primarily
because recommender systems heavily rely on the end-users to externalize their
personal data, and the e cacy of these algorithms depends on the accuracy and
relevance of this information. The concept of privacy, as well as the act of data
disclosure are human behaviours, and developers of recommender systems must
conduct in-depth experiments about the users’ privacy-related attitudes and their
information disclosure behaviour to augment user-satisfaction [ ].
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 .  Motivation
Massive amounts of user data is generated in the scope of recommender systems.
The ubiquity of recommender systems, their utility and user base makes them a
threat to user privacy, if the data is inappropriately accessed or used. Therefore,
it is imperative for system architects and designers to find a balance, so that they
can not only generate accurate recommendations, but also guarantee privacy
of their users [ ]. In this regard, several algorithmic as well as cryptographic
approaches have been suggested, including pseudonymity-based personalization
[ ,  ], obfuscation [  ,   ], di erential privacy [  ] and additive homomorphic
encryption using Paillier public-key cryptosystem [  ].
These approaches are, however, purely technical in nature, and do not take
into account the end-users, for whom privacy is intended to be championed.
Indeed, Friedman et al. [ ] argue that in most cases, the users’ cognitive resources
are insu cient to e ectively take control over their privacy. Several companies
and their recommender systems implementations make use of this dichotomy in
privacy attitudes and behaviours of users, in order to extract more information
from the user to make their systems more e ective. This dichotomy is known
as Privacy Paradox in privacy literature, and was first pointed out by Norberg
et al. [  ]. Therefore, it is important to better understand the privacy needs of
individual users, provide them with transparent options, and help them make
the right privacy decisions for themselves.
 .  Outline of the Paper
In the next section, we talk about privacy attitudes and behaviour. In particular,
we focus on the dichotomy between the two, also known as Privacy Paradox.
In Section  , we talk about the internal and external factors that influence
information disclosure and decision making in an online scenario. In Section  ,
we bring together inferences from studies in the area of privacy and information
systems research and psychology to suggest steps and techniques that developers
and companies building recommender systems should follow while designing such
systems. These best practices would ensure that the user’s privacy concerns are
placed at the center of the system, and their privacy is not undermined.
  Privacy Attitudes and Behaviour
 .  Privacy Paradox
Norberg et al. [  ], in their studies, essentially investigate the factors of risk and
trust with respect to actual human privacy behaviours, and the relationships
between these two factors. They wanted to ascertain whether risk considerations
also induce a user’s actual information disclosure behaviour. These studies were
motivated by the fact that the onset of the information age has enabled collection,
sharing and processing of huge amounts of data, and has given marketers access
to a treasure of personal user data and preferences. However, this has, at the same
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Fig.  . The relationship between intentions and behaviour: Traditional Approach
time, serious ramifications for user privacy. The authors argue and hypothesize
that risk influences a user’s intention to disclose but risk factors are not strong
enough to influence actual disclosure behaviour. In other words, when a user is
directly asked about his intention to disclose, risk factors are at play, however,
in an actual disclosure scenario, trust as an environmental cue is expected to
significantly impact the user’s decisions.
Previous research [  ,   ] has focused on the interfusion of risk and trust in
context of a user’s behavioural intention. The traditional model says that both risk
and trust influence behavioural intentions, which then influences actual behaviour.
This is shown in Figure  . However, Norberg et al. argue that behavioural intention
is not predictive of actual disclosure behaviour, because risk and trust operate
independently. Detailed user studies to confirm Privacy Paradox are well-described
in the paper by Norberg et al. [  ]
Fig.  . The relationship between intentions and behaviour: Privacy Paradox
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 .  Risk and Privacy Attitudes
It has been very well established that behavioral intentions are a culmination of an
individual’s attitude, subjective norms and perceived control of an outcome [  ].
Moreover, O’Keefe and Daniel [  ] show that the correlation between intention
and behaviour varies between  .   and  .  , and that the measure is more
accurate when behaviour is voluntary. Apart from that, the following factors
have also been shown to influence the strength of correlation: a) the degree of
correspondence between the measure of intention and the measure of behavior [  ],
b) the temporal stability of intention [  ,  ] and c) the degree to which the
behaviour was planned [  ,  ].
One of the first research e orts in the area of general privacy concern was
undertaken by Westin and Harris and Associates [  ], who classified people
into three categories based on their privacy attitudes: Privacy Fundamentalists,
Pragmatists and Unconcerned. However, in the context of user privacy, it is indeed
evident that one’s stated intentions might not be reflective of behaviour, because
of factors like heuristic processing and routinization of behaviour, that influence
intention and behaviour very di erently [  ]. Moreover, it has also been shown
that social desirability bias could contaminate one’s response to the question of
behavioural intention to an extent that it would no longer be indicative of actual
behaviour.
Moreover, the most important consideration for recommender systems de-
signers is that privacy concerns are extremely system/context-specific, rather
than a generic factor [  ]. Therefore, a user’s privacy attitude can be signifi-
cantly di erent based on system-specific factors such as a) perceived privacy
threats [ ,  ], b) perceived protection [ ] and c) trust in the company [  ], among
others. Therefore, system engineers, architects and developers should make sure
that they focus not only on the protecting the user privacy via technical means,
but try to make the user feel that they are at the center of the system, i.e user
privacy is of paramount importance at every stage of the system. This philosophy
is often referred to as Privacy by Design [  ].
At this point, it might be worthwhile to excurse and talk about Privacy
by Design, introduce the idea and concept behind it, and what it means and
represents.
Privacy by Design Cavoukian [  ] lays out   foundational principles of Privacy
by Design(PbD). PbD is a set of guidelines for software system architects to
design privacy-centred systems. According to her,
The universal principles of the Fair Information Practices (FIPs) are
a rmed by those of Privacy by Design, but go beyond them to seek the
highest global standard possible. Extending beyond FIPs, PbD represents
a significant “raising” of the bar in the area of privacy protection.
The   foundational principles of PbD are: a) Proactive not Reactive; Preven-
tative not Remedial, b) Privacy as the Default, c) Privacy Embedded into Design,
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d) Full Functionality - Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum, e) End-to-End Security -
Lifecycle Protection, f) Visibility and Transparency, and g) Respect for User
Privacy
 .  Trust and Privacy Behaviour
Several psychologists have noted that while making privacy decisions, people
often make a trade-o  between risks and benefits [  ]. Culnan and Bies [  ] call
this as Privacy Calculus. Privacy Calculus is also influenced by several other
factors, but the most influential of them is trust. Trust can be defined in several
ways, one of them is ‘willingness to rely on an exchange partner’ [  ]. Trust can
be tangibly measured in terms of a company’s reputation, brand name and status.
This means that in spite of the actual trade o  between risks and benefits, a user
is expected to disclose more information if he places a considerable amount of
trust in a company. Cranor et al. [  ] have indeed shown that there is a positive
correlation between the amount of information disclosed, and the amount of trust
reposed in a particular brand or company.
To motivate this, let us take an example with two hypothetical companies
Doogle and BuckBuckGo, both of which are into the business of recommending
restaurants. The user has been using products o ered by Doogle for a long time,
and holds the company in high regard. On the other hand, BuckBuckGo is a
relatively new entrant, and doesn’t o er any other services apart from restaurant
recommendation. Both the companies ask for the user’s home address as a part
of the service sign-up process. The user is quite privacy-minded, i.e. a Privacy
Fundamentalist, according to the classification criteria of Westin and Harris
and Associates [  ], i.e. he/she believes that one should not disclose their home
address in an online scenario. The research of Cranor et al. [  ], however, posits
that nevertheless, there is a very high probability that the user in fact, discloses
his/her home address in order to use the service o ered by Doogle. However, the
same user might be inclined to think think that their home address is not directly
related to the service being o ered by BuckBuckGo, and therefore would avoid
using that service. This is also confirmed and reiterated by Norberg et al. [  ]
in their research on Privacy Paradox. This example clearly demonstrates that
a person, whilst having the same privacy attitudes, shows di erent disclosure
behaviour.
To conclude, privacy paradox exists and is very much apparent, e.g. in the
online marketplace. This means that users are often found making a trade-o 
between risks and benefits of disclosure, also known as Privacy Calculus. This
decision is also dependent on the context and relevance [ ] with respect to the
purpose of the system. Another factor, which consequently operates, is the amount
of trust that the users repose in that brand or company.
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  How do humans perceive Privacy in the context of
Personalization?
In the previous section, we have described the intimate ways in which risk and
trust act to determine privacy attitudes and behaviour. But the question arises,
what factors do privacy decisions really depend on? This question can only be
answered by a close study into human psychology. The research performed by
Acquisti et al. [  ] systematically lays down three interconnected factors which
influence decision-making in privacy scenarios: a) People’s uncertainty about the
consequences of privacy-related behaviors and their own preferences over those
consequences b) The context-dependence of people’s concern, or lack thereof,
about privacy, and c) The degree to which privacy concerns are malleable, i.e.
manipulable by commercial and governmental interests. We explain in detail,
each of the factors in the subsections below.
Fig. . Factors which a ect Information Disclosure. The double headed arrows signify
that these factors are connected to each other, and influence each other
 .  Uncertainty
According to Acquisti et al. [  ], the foremost and most obvious form of privacy
uncertainty stems from incomplete or asymmetric information. In most instances,
users of recommender systems do not have a clear knowledge of what data has
been collected from them, and how it is being used, or would be used in the future.
The frequently changing End User License Agreements (EULA), along with the
fact that they are worded in such a way that makes a normal user averse to reading
them, also contributes to this problem. Therefore, people are uncertain about
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how much information they should disclose. The authors also say that whereas
on one hand, some privacy harms are tangible, such as financial costs due to
identity theft, several others, such as a voyeur getting access to someone’s private
images, are intangible. The second reason for uncertainty relates to Privacy
Paradox. People are extremely sure of their privacy preferences, although they are
unaware of the consequences of their behaviours. In this regard, Singer et al. [  ]
conducted a study in which they asked sensitive and potentially incriminating
questions either point-blank, or accompanied with assurances of confidentiality.
Contrary to expectation, these assurances did not lead to broader divulgence,
because they elevated the users’ privacy concerns. People’s privacy attitudes are
made complicated by the existence of a powerful countervailing motivation: the
desire to be public, share, and disclose. Acquisti et al. [  ]argue that humans are
social animals, with an inherent desire to share personal information. Information
sharing is a central feature of human connection. This is also confirmed by
social penetration theory [  ], which says that increasing levels of disclosure are
natural, and a desirable evolution of interpersonal relationships from superficial
to intimate.
 .  Context-Dependence
Context plays a major role in determining how much information is disclosed
in what kind of a situation. Acquisti et al. [  ] find that when people are
unsure about their preferences in a particular situation, they take cues from
the environment to aid them to make a decision. To speak in terms of the
classification by Westin [  ], humans are Privacy Fundamentalists, Pragmatists
or Unconcerned based on time and place. There are several individual factors,
which together embody context-dependence.
One of them is the amount of closeness with the person with whom information
is being shared. E.g. it might be much easier to share sensitive information with a
friend rather than a stranger on the flight [  ]. In the context of personalization
and recommender systems, this translates to brand confidence and familiarity with
the services o ered by the company. Moreover, stringent goverment regulations
are a favourable factor, enabling people to share more information, as they reduce
concern and increase trust [  ]. One startling and counter-intuitive factor is
user-interface design. John et al. [  ] found in an online study, that people
were much more likely to disburse personal and incriminating information on an
unprofessionally and casually designed website with a banner ‘How Bad R U?’,
compared to a website with a much more formal interface. Yet another contextual
factor is the physical environment encompassing the person. It has been shown by
Chaikin et al. [  ] that all other factors being equal, intimacy of self-disclosure
is larger in warm and comfortable surroundings, with soft lighting rather than in
cold rooms with bare cement and fluorescent lighting. It has also been shown that
people are influenced to externalise more personal information when they get to
know that other people have also given out the same information. Turbulence of
Privacy Boundaries, i.e. when trust boundaries are broken, e.g. a post on social
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Fig.  . Context Dependence of Privacy Decisions
media reaching an unintended audience, people are much more likely to exercise
restraint and limit the visibility of their future posts to a selected audience.
All these criteria directly apply to systems which aim for personalization, be-
cause they are all dependent on a user disclosing personal, potentially-incriminating
information such as shopping history, hobbies, age, birthday and so on.
 .  Malleability
The tremendous amount of available data has given rise to entities whose economic
or business interests are to gain personal information. Companies that build
recommender systems are counted among such entities, apart from several other
types of businesses, e.g. those involved in behavioural advertising or online
social networks. These entities study behavioural and psychological processes and
incorporate subtleties which a ect the user’s disclosure behaviour. This leads to
malleability of the user’s privacy preferences. Defaults are a common and widely
used example. Defaults are considered by users as implicit recommendations, and
it is often much more convenient for people to let the default option be their
choice. This has been used in websites collecting organ donor or retirement savings
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information, and also in privacy settings for social network profile visibility [  ].
Another such manoeuvre is Malicious Interface Design, by which entities develop
their user interface features in a way that frustrates or irritates a user into
providing more information. A research by Hoofnagle et al. [  ] also showed that
merely showing or posting a Privacy Policy, which users might not even read,
led to users having a misplaced feeling of being protected. Another strategy that
service providers knowingly use, is to not alert the user, or send a warning, when
a potentially harmful privacy setting is used.
Fig.  . Malleability: Factors which seek to undermine the user’s privacy decisions
  Towards a Human-Centric Privacy Adaptation
We have looked at various human factors and tendencies in regards to information
disclosure, especially in the context of personalized systems. We have also looked
at how humans perceive privacy in such systems, and how internal and external
factors influence decision making. Recommender Systems and other such systems
which aim for personalization have definitely proved to be a boon for internet
users. However, this has come at a cost, i.e., users have lesser control over personal
information that the companies know about them.
Companies and developers of recommender systems often take advantage of
inherent human weaknesses to cajole system users to externalize more information.
At the same time, there are several start-up companies as well as entities trying
to foray into personalized systems, looking for best practices for developing a
system that is extremely useful, but at the same time, designed with user privacy
in mind, and that places the user at the center of the system. Such a set of
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guidelines is not readily available to guide the developers. Privacy by Design [  ]
is a step in the right direction, however it is often too generic, vague and idealistic
to provide realistic guidelines of any kind.
In this section, we try to introduce concepts and best practices which enable
the development of Human Centric Personalization Systems. This makes sure,
that the users have an accurate knowledge of what the systems aim to provide,
and what they, in turn, expect from them. At the same time, most users of these
systems are not specialists in computer science, psychology or law. Therefore,
the users’ cognitive resources are in most cases, insu cient to e ectively take
control over their privacy and make safe and informed decisions [ ]. Therefore,
the onus falls on the entities developing these systems to guide the users make
the best privacy decisions for themselves. This is a win-win situation for both
parties, because it has been shown that building trust reduces concerns about
privacy, and the user discloses more information. At the same, it portrays a
positive image of the company in the minds of the users.
 .  Striking the correct balance of Transparency and Control
Both transparency and control are fundamental to gaining the user’s trust and
helping them engage in a privacy calculus. People can make informed decisions
only if adequate information is provided to them. It has often been suggested
that recommender systems should give users advanced controls over their privacy.
However, while users often claim to want complete control of their privacy, they
eschew the trouble of exercising this control [  ]. A fully transparent system
suggests that all the fine-grained, ground details and information regarding their
privacy should be available to the user. This is not a bad thing to do, but it
has been shown to hinder system usage rather than encouraging it [  ]. Bakos
et al. [  ] found that only a miniscule  . % people read End User License
Agreements (EULAs), and summarizing them with trust seals is often counter-
productive [  ]. This is not surprising, as most of these documents are lengthy
and filled to the brim with legal and technical jargon. Although it shows positive
intent on part of the company, it often does not fulfill its objective. Keeping all
the above factors in mind, we would like to suggest the following best practices
to achieve the right amount of transparency and control.
– Displaying the complete EULA is not bad and indeed, in most cases, it is
also a legal requirement. However, there should be a real e ort to explain
to the user, the contents of the EULA which are most relevant for their
privacy. This should be done in way that the user can easily understand
and absorb, e.g. with a video or animation. The user should preferably get
the idea that a human is talking to them, and if possible, with a two-way
conversation and not just a monologue. Recent advances in speech recognition
and virtual assistants have made this possible [  ]. This feels much more
intuitive to the user, and builds trust easily, while also making them aware
of the fundamental privacy aspects of the system.
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– A lot of times, the user does not have the time to go through all the privacy
aspects of the system during the signup process. Therefore, this should be
made available at all times for future reference, so that they have the option
of having a look at it at a later stage.
– Future modifications of the EULAs and privacy policies of the companies
should avoid relaxing currently existing ones. If this is unavoidable however,
the user should at least be well-informed about the important changes, and
should be provided with an alternative, if they would like to opt-out of
providing personal information due to the ramifications of these changes.
– All privacy controls relevant to the system should preferably be condensed
into one page, e.g. in a Dashboard format, to make sure that exercising control
over privacy is convenient and not distressing to the user. Moreover, these
settings should be easily accessible, and not obscure or confounding.
– To especially cater to the needs of technically oriented or advanced users,
it should also be possible to know about the fine-grained details of exactly
what information is collected from the users, and how it is used to make the
recommendations better. These descriptions could be technical in nature,
and need not necessarily be shown to the users during the signup process,
but available for reference. This would make sure that it doesn’t flare up
anxiety in the minds of the user, but at the same time, the system remains
fully transparent.
 .  Privacy Nudges
An important feature that developers should incorporate into their personalization
systems is called as Privacy Nudges. Nudges are meant to drive users towards
making the right privacy decisions for themselves. Recent research [  ] has shown
that nudges are quite often a very e ective technique that helps reduce the regret
associated with decision-making, and that helps users make the correct choice
without limiting their ability to choose freely. [ ]. Privacy Nudges can be divided
into two broad categories: Justifications and Defaults.
Justifications Justifications are an e ective way to help a user rationalize their
decisions. It also makes them better understand the significance of why the
information is required by the system, and how it makes the user experience
better. There can be di erent ways of providing justifications, some of them are:
a) Providing a reason for requesting the information [  ] b) Highlighting the
benefits of disclosure [  ], and c) Appealing to the social norm [  ,  ] . Again,
these justifications need to be made in a manner that is not too intrusive, and
that blends well with the design of the system, rather than appearing to be an
erroneous parameter. At the same time, they should also be easily understandable,
even by the non-expert user. The actual results produced by using justications
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Fig. . Privacy Nudges: Guiding the users towards making the right privacy decisions
for themselves
seems to be inconclusive. Acquisti et al. [  ] found that users were   % more likely
to disclose the same information, when they learnt that other people had also
agreed to disclose that information. On the other hand, Knijnenburg et al. tested
justifications in a demographics and context-based mobile app recommender [  ],
and found that it actually decreased disclosure. However, most studies agree that
users find justifications to be helpful in making privacy-related decisions, and that
only a particular subset of users are amenable to justifications, i.e. non-expert
users [  ].
Defaults Defaults are another means of nudging a user. They aim to release the
user’s burden of having to make a decision by himself. Defaults are essentially
implicit recommendations, and they play a significant role in influencing privacy
decisions [  ]. Carefully setting defaults can be a stimulant, and can increase
user participation. However, the defaults should make sure that user privacy is
not undermined. Another form of defaults is the order of intrusiveness in which
questions are posed. Acquisti et al. [  ] have shown that posing questions in a
random order of intrusiveness is more e ective than posing them in an increasing
order of sensitivity.
 .  Tailor-Made Privacy Decision Support: Privacy Adaptation
In Section  . , while introducing Privacy Nudges, we have asserted that processes
such as justifications and defaults are meant to nudge the user towards making the
right decision. With this description, arises an extremely plausible interrogation:
What is meant by the “right” decision? We have already seen, especially in Section
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 .  that human decisions are extremely context-dependent, and this applies to
information disclosure decisions as well. Internal and external factors play a
pivotal role in determining what information is externalized. Keeping this into
account, it can be argued that no single privacy default can be ideally suited for
all users. What is ideal for one user, might not be ideal for another [  ]. The
same holds for justifications as well, i.e., what is justifiable for one user, might be
completely irrelevant for another user, depending on the item to be disclosed and
di erent contextual factors [ ,  ]. These arguments pave way for the application
domain of Tailor-Made Privacy Decision Support for recommender systems. This
is also called as Privacy Adaptation, i.e. adapting privacy nudges for an individual
user by modeling their behaviour in di erent disclosure scenarios.
Fig.  . A brief overview of the steps involved in Privacy Adaptation
Privacy Adaptation provides a tenable middle-ground between giving full
privacy control to the user, and giving them no control at all. Gaining a deeper
understanding of a user’s cognitive decision-making behaviour not only helps the
system to suggest better privacy defaults, but enables the user to repose more
faith and trust in it [  ]. The work of Knijnenberg et al. has focused on trying
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to measure these information disclosure decisions and materialize them into
behavioural models of information disclosure decisions. They take into account
the Privacy Calculus that the user is confronted with, i.e. the balance of risks
and benefits for the user in a particular disclosure scenario [  ]. Apart from this,
the other factors are the recipient of the information, the item to be disclosed,
and the kind of user (i.e. privacy attitude). They also try to group users based on
their privacy preferences in several domains, and identify distinct subgroups [  ].
These subgroups, when combined with other information such as demographics
and other behaviours, can be e ectively used to tailor privacy decisions for the
user. Similar e orts have been made by Ravichandran et al. [  ], who have tried
to use k-means clustering to cluster users in the context of their location sharing
preferences, and devise default policies based on this. They have also shown that
a small number of default policies are able to represent a large number of users,
which significantly reduces the complexity of tailoring privacy decisions. Sadeh at
al. [  ] also tried to learn user privacy preferences in a location-sharing system
by applying the k-nearest neighbour algorithm and random forests. Schaub et
al. [  ] have proposed a framework for dynamic privacy adaptation system in
the context of ubiquitous computing.
In e ect, Privacy Adaptation can be succinctly described as a recommender
system to enable user privacy in a recommender system. Although our previous
examples describe the application of privacy adaptation for tailoring privacy
defaults, they can also be used for customizing justifications. Although we have
shown in Section  .  that justifications do not necessarily lead to an increase
in information disclosure, customizing justifications based on user preferences
counterbalances their negative e ect [  ].
Privacy Adaptation provides a unique way to find a balance between too much
and too little control for the user. It gives us a way to find the “right” privacy
decision for the user by using their own preferences as a yardstick. Context-aware
approaches also provide an e ective solution to the problem when the user is
overwhelmed by too much information, which further heightens their privacy
concerns.
  Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we have tried to argue that technical solutions are not enough to
address privacy concerns and challenges in the domain of personalized systems.
These systems are developed for human consumption, and therefore, psychological
and behavioural issues are extremely important to be taken into account. We
have shown how a user’s privacy attitudes are not a true reflection of their
actual disclosure behaviour. This is mainly because they are driven by totally
independent factors, that of risk and trust respectively, which operate in di erent
ways. For this reason, we consider the user’s behaviour and preferences in actual
online disclosure scenarios for building adaptive privacy recommending systems.
In Section  , we have presented and described the various factors that influence
the user’s decisions. A close study of these factors is essential not only for
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developers of recommender systems, but also sometimes for users, to be better
aware of how their inherently “human” characteristics and traits can be leveraged
by recommender systems to make them disclose more information than they
actually intended to.
We have discussed at length, not only about the e ects of uncertainty on
information disclosure, but also of seemingly innocuous context-factors such
as lighting and temperature around the user. In addition, we have shown how
companies and other entities can use tricks such as malicious user interfaces to
undermine user concerns about privacy. We have presented several techniques
and best practices that system developers and start-up companies foraying into
recommender systems and allied areas should consider. This is especially essential
for gaining a user’s trust and reducing the possibility of any untoward privacy
related mishaps. The concept of Privacy Nudges has been introduced, by which
we aim to help the user make correct privacy decisions for themselves.
Finally, we have shown that the meaning of “right” privacy decisions can
vary, not only from user-to-user, but also from context-to-context. What kind
of information is to be disclosed, who is the receiver of this information, what
kind of service is being provided to the user in lieu of this information etc. play
a decisive role in determining whether disclosing the information is the “right”
decision for a user. For this purpose, it is highly recommended to include some
form of Privacy Adaptation in modern recommender systems. This provides
a method to enable user-centric privacy defaults and justifications, which are
tailored for the individual user, using his own preferences and behaviours in
real information disclosure scenarios. We would like to conclude by asserting
that if these recommended proposals are considered by developers and entities
building personalized systems, it would take us one-step closer to realizing truly
user-centric systems, and would extinguish privacy concerns to a great extent.
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